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statements are forever relative, and derive their authority from no source but the breast of the speaker or hearer. And it is this view I have wished to develop.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE METHODS OF ETHICS. By Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Fifth edition. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.

The continued popularity of this great work is shown by the appearance of a fifth edition after an interval of little more than three years from the appearance of the fourth. The dates of the various editions—1874, 1877, 1884, 1890, 1893—seem to indicate that the demand for the book is steadily increasing.

The changes that have been made in this edition are not of great importance. They affect chiefly the treatment of two points—Free Will and Ultimate Good.

In the chapter on Free Will (Book I., chap. v.) the arrangement of the sections has been slightly altered, and some modifications have been introduced into the statements, the effect of which seems to be, on the whole, that of making the case for Determinism more effective. The one argument in favor of Indeterminism does, indeed, still remain; but there is an omission of the passage in which it was stated that "I must use, in thinking about action, the only conception of human volition that is now possible to me; and this is strictly incompatible with the conception of my choice between rational judgment and irrational inclination as predetermined." An interesting passage has also been added (p. 71) about *remorse*, in which it is argued that this experience is quite compatible with a determinist view of action. The passage about punishment, which occurs at this point, has been slightly modified—the point about *quantity* being omitted. The chief argument against the retributive view of punishment now appears in a note, in which it is urged that rebellion is punished even when the rebel was "prompted by a sincere desire to serve God or to benefit mankind," and that this is incompatible with the view that punishment is a retribution for ill-desert. But it may be answered that the ill-

desert of which account is taken in such a case, is only ill-desert with reference to the State. The State can only take account of men's actions so far as they concern its special province; but the fact that its view is thus limited, does not seem incompatible with the theory that the punishment which it inflicts has reference to desert within these limits.

In the chapter on the *Summum Bonum* (Book III., chap. xiv.), some modifications have been introduced in the arguments leading up to the Hedonistic position, which is finally adopted. The arguments on pp. 395, 396 against Virtue as the Ultimate Good are no longer held to establish the truth that, "however prominent Virtue may properly be made in a popular description of the good or desirable life, we cannot introduce it into an exact statement of the nature of Ultimate Good;" but only that "neither subjective rightness . . . nor virtuous character . . . can be regarded as constituting Ultimate Good." It is thus admitted, so far, that Virtue may be an element in Ultimate Good. It may be partly a means and partly an end. Dr. Sidgwick goes on to argue, however (p. 397), that "so far as we judge virtuous activity to be a part of Ultimate Good, it is . . . because the consciousness attending it is judged to be in itself desirable for the virtuous agent; though, at the same time, this consideration does not adequately represent the importance of Virtue to human well-being, since we have to consider its value as a means as well as its value as an end. We may make the distinction clearer by considering whether virtuous life would remain, on the whole, good for the virtuous agent, if we suppose it combined with extreme pain. The affirmative answer to this question was strongly supported in Greek philosophical discussion; but it is a paradox from which a modern thinker would recoil; he would hardly venture to assert that the portion of life* spent by a martyr in tortures was in itself desirable, —though it might be his duty to suffer the pain with a view to the good of others, and even his interest to suffer it with a view to his own ultimate happiness." The remainder of the argument then proceeds pretty much as before. Dr. Sidgwick still does not appear to have adequately considered the question whether, in the

* I may remark here in passing that Dr. Sidgwick appears to assume throughout his work that it is possible to divide life into separate portions; and to estimate the value of one portion, in abstraction from the rest. Such an assumption seems quite unjustifiable.

definition of the Ultimate Good, abstraction can be made of the concrete content of life, any more than of the pleasant consciousness. He has made it tolerably clear, I think, that one side of the abstraction cannot be carried out :* it remains for him to show that the other is equally unreasonable.

The other changes in this edition do not seem to call for special notice. The Index at the end (the work of Miss Jones, of Girton), which formed so valuable an improvement in the fourth edition, has been adapted to the new material. I may observe, however, that it contains no reference to Remorse or Responsibility. I have not observed any other defects. In the Preface to the fifth edition, line 6, "Book III., chap. iv." should evidently be altered to "Book III., chap. xiv."

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THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS. By J. H. Muirhead, M.A. Second Edition, University Extension Series. London : John Murray, 1894.

All who are interested in good thinking on ethical questions will welcome the reappearance, in a second edition, of Mr. J. H. Muirhead's excellent manual on the "Elements of Ethics" (*University Extension Series*, Murray). The book has been revised throughout and somewhat enlarged, mainly by the addition of many new footnotes, referring to the history and literature of ethics and dealing with criticisms upon the earlier edition. An index has also been added and the bibliography has been brought up to date ; so that, while the volume retains substantially its original form and structure, its value as a text-book has been considerably increased. The chief additions to the text of the book are new sections, one of which deals with the principal "Objection to the Study of Ethics," and another briefly explains, with historical references, "Intuitionism as an Ethical Theory," while the chapter on "The Standard as Progressive" has been considerably amplified and improved by further historical illustration. To the objection against the study of ethics on the ground that it is practically "unsettling," Mr. Muirhead replies by pointing out that "the wound in the moral peace

* It should be remembered that very few of the opponents of Hedonism in modern times affirm that this side of the abstraction can be carried out. See, for instance, Mr. Bradley's "Personal Explanation" in the April number of this JOURNAL.